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INTERNATIONAL RAMIFICATIONS OF THE FISHERY
CONSERVATION AND MANAGEMENT ACT OF 1976
I. INTRODUCTION
On April 13, 1976, President Ford signed the Fishery Conservation and
Management Act of 1976 (hereinafter referred to as the Fisheries Act).' The
Fisheries Act established a 200 mile fishery conservation zone' effective
March 1, 1977,1 over which the United States will exercise exclusive fishery
management.4 This action made the United States the first major power-
to declare unilaterally a 200 mile exclusive fisheries zone' (hereinafter
referred to as EZ). Although the President7 and many experts8 expressed
grave doubts as to the legality of the EZ under customary international
law, the consensus of the Third Law of the Sea Conference as to the
necessity for 200 mile exclusive economic zones' and the general accept-
ance of the inevitability of such zones minimized adverse reaction. 0 Even
assuming the United States has not violated currently accepted precepts
of international law, other aspects of the unilateral action are as proble-
matic. Among the issues to be faced by the United States in the implemen-
I Fishery Conservation and Management Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-265, 90 Stat. 331
(codified in scattered sections of 1800, 16 U.S.C.A. (Ph. 2, pt. 1, June 1976)) [hereinafter
cited as Fisheries Act].
Id. § 1811.
3 Id.
4 Id. § 1812.
See G. KNIGHT, THE LAW OF THE SEA: CASES, DocuMENTs, AND READINGS 697-715 (1975-76)
[hereinafter cited as KNIGHT].
I Canada unilaterally declared a 100 mile Arctic anti-pollution zone in 1970 which met with
violent protests from the United States. Henkin, Arctic Anti-Pollution: Does Canada
Make-or Break-International Law?, 65 AM. J. INT'L L. 131 (1971) [hereinafter cited as
Henkin].
I Statement by the President Upon Signing H.R. 200 Into Law, 12 WEEKLY COMP. OF PRES.
Doc. 634 (April 13, 1976) [hereinafter cited as Presidential Statement].
Two-Hundred-Mile Fishing Zone: Hearing on S. 961 Before the Subcomm. on Oceans and
the International Environment of the Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations, 94th Cong., 1st
Sess. 159 (1975) (prepared statement of Hon. John Norton Moore) [hereinafter cited as
Fishing Zone Hearing]; see also Wall St. J., Oct. 23, 1975, at 18, col. 4.
1 U.S. DELEGATION, REPORT ON THIRD UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON THE LAW OF THE SEA
1 (New York, Aug. 2 - Sept. 17, 1976), reprinted in Status Report on the Law of the Sea
Conference before the Subcomm. on Minerals, Materials, and Fuels of the Senate Interior &
Insular Affairs Comm., 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 1618-37 (June 8, 1976) [hereinafter cited as U.S.
DELEGATION REP.].
10 Japan is the only nation that has formally notified the United States that it will not
recognize American jurisdiction in the 200 mile zone. Letter from Kathryn Clark-Bourne,
Director of Fisheries Affairs, Bureau of Oceans and International Environmental and Scien-
tific Affairs, to Donna Christie (Nov. 3, 1976).
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tation of the Fisheries Act are impediments to prior treaty obligations and
Law of the Sea Conference negotiations, stress on relations with the Soviet
Union, Japan and Latin America, a rash of other unilaterally declared
zones which go beyond the scope of the Fisheries Act, and enforceability.
This Note will attempt to elucidate the international aspects of these
issues as they affect the United States and the world community.
I. PRIOR TREATY OBLIGATIONS
The United States is a party to eleven bilateral and six multilateral
fishing agreements which give the signatories the juridical right to conduct
fishing operations within the areas that will be designated exclusive fisher-
ies management zones." The Fisheries Act provides that foreign fishing
may be conducted pursuant to these prior agreements. 2 The Act also re-
quires, however, that the Secretary of State promptly renegotiate any
treaties that pertain to fishing within the EZ in order to conform the treaty
terms to the legislation. 3 If such treaties are not renegotiated within a
reasonable time, the Act asserts that the United States will withdraw from
the treaty.'
The United States takes the position in its internal constitutional law
that a subsequently enacted law will be given effect over a prior conflicting
treaty. 5 Clearly, however, the enforcement of the Fisheries Act against
foreign parties to fishing agreements without renegotiation would be a
violation of the treaties and customary international law. 6 Less clear is
whether use of such blackmail-type tactics by the United States to induce
renegotiations is sanctioned by international law. Arguably, under the
doctrine of pacta sunt servanda, 7 by enacting legislation inconsistent with
prior treaties the United States is acting in bad faith in performance of its
treaty obligations"8 even if withdrawal from the treaties is in accordance
with the terms of the agreements. 9 If such is the case, the Fisheries Act
amounts to a unilateral denunciation of treaties involving fishing within
1 H.R. REP. No. 542, 94th Cong., Ist Sess. 9 (1975) [hereinafter cited as HOUSE REP.]; see
generally Jacobs, United States Participation in International Fisheries Agreements, 6 J.
MAR. L. & COMM. 471 (1974-75).
" Fisheries Act, 16 U.S.C.A. (Ph. 2, pt. 1, June 1976) § 1821(b).
13 Id. § 1822(b).
4 Id.
'5 The view in the United States is that a treaty and a legislative act are placed on the
same footing by the Constitution. If a treaty and legislation are completely inconsistent, the
most recent in date will control. Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U.S. 190, 194 (1888).
' Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, opened for signature May 23, 1969, art. 27,
U.N.Doc. AICONF. 39/27 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Vienna Convention].
'7 Id. art. 26: "Every treaty in force is binding upon the parties to it and must be performed
by them in good faith."
'8 Fishing Zone Hearing, supra note 8, at 109-10.
" Fisheries Act, 16 U.S.C.A. (Ph. 2, pt. 1, June 1976) § 1822(b).
[Vol. 7:133
FISHERIES CONSERVATION ACT
the area designated EZ. In the Fisheries Jurisdiction Cases,20 the Interna-
tional Court of Justice found that a nation's rights with regatd to denun-
ciation of treaties as set forth in the Vienna Convention and ix customary
international law are surrounded by substantive conditions and limita-
tions.2 ' That is, in a treaty with no provisions for termination there is no
true right of unilateral denunciation; however, there are certain interna-
tionally recognized circumstances that will justify termination.12 Inherent
in the Court's opinion is the requirement that any termination, withdrawal
or suspension must be in good faith in order to meet the conditions essen-
tial for the assertion of such a right. It would not be unreasonable to
assume that this good faith condition might apply to treaties with provi-
sions for termination,23 in which case the United States would be required
to demonstrate a more reasonable justification for invoking a termination
provision than the fact that the other party refused to renegotiate a for-
merly mutually acceptable agreement in order to conform to terms newly
imposed by the United States. Despite the argument's feasibility it is
unlikely that it would be utilized because nations do not want to develop
a principle of international law that would encroach to such an extent on
their sovereignty. Even if the principle were developed, it would probably
be unenforceable. 24
III. LAW OF THE SEA CONFERENCE NEGOTIATIONS
The United Nations is currently conducting a series of Law of the Sea
Conferences in an attempt to negotiate a comprehensive international
agreement as to the rights and duties of nations. Prior to the enactment
of the Fisheries Act the United States supported the concept of interna-
tional agreement and strongly opposed unilateral action in this area.2
However, increased internal pressures and foreign overfishing mandated
the legislation. President Ford said he signed the bill because of three
major factors: (1) the slow pace of the Law of the Sea (LOS) Conference
United Kingdom v. Iceland, [1972] I.C.J. 3, reprinted in 11 INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS 1069
(1972).
11 Id.; see also Briggs, Unilateral Denunciation of Treaties: The Vienna Convention and
the International Court of Justice, 68 AM. J. INT'L L. 51, 68 (1974).
" Id. at 66; Vienna Convention supra note 16, art. 60 (material breach), art. 61 (impossibil-
ity of performance), art. 62 (fundamental change of circumstances), art. 63 (severance of
relations).
1 All bilateral fishing agreements of the United States have provisions for termination. See
Fishing Zone Hearing, supra note 8, at 174.
24 Interview with Dean Rusk, Sibley Professor of International Law, University of Georgia
School of Law (Oct. 27, 1976).
" President's Message to the International Commission for the Northwest Atlantic Fisher-
ies, 11 WEEKLY COMP. OF PRES. Doc. 1065 (Sept. 23, 1975); Address by Secretary of State
Henry A. Kissinger Before the American Bar Ass'n, Montreal, Canada (Aug. 11, 1975),
reprinted in Fishing Zone Hearing, supra note 8, at 296; 73 DEP'T STATE Bu.L. 623 (Oct. 27,
1975).
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negotiations; (2) the fact that the legislation is consistent with United
States objectives at the LOS Conference;26 and (3) the effective date of the
legislation is delayed until March 1, 1977.Y The Fisheries Act is intended
as an interim measure" and contains provisions for the amendment of the
Act in the event the United States ratifies a comprehensive treaty resulting
from the United Nations Law of the Sea Conference. 9
Because many of the issues faced by the LOS Conference are mutually
dependent, passage of the Fisheries Act by the United States may have
resulted in the loss of negotiating power on apparently nonrelated issues.3
Of even greater consequence is the possibility that this action may affect
the likelihood of any agreement being reached at the LOS Conference.3'
The 200 mile exclusive economic zone is one principle that has been gener-
ally accepted at the LOS Conference and former Secretary of State Kissin-
ger has stated that the Fisheries Act has not impeded the progress of
negotiation in that area.2 However, the United States, by its unilateral
action, has set a dangerous precedent, enabling other nations to assert
similar claims ul with a resulting "sea-grab" by coastal states u When these
nations are allowed to assert such unilateral claims successfully, the incen-
tive to reach an international agreement is eliminated . 3 The positive as-
pect of such unilateral action is that many of its original oppo-
nents-landlocked and geographically disadvantaged states-have vir-
tually conceded the principle of a 200 mile economic zone, preferring to
have the zones established by negotiation rather than appropriation by
coastal states.3 6 Since a Law of the Sea Conference treaty will now be the
only sure way of protecting their interests, landlocked and geographically
disadvantaged nations will be more inclined to conclude negotiations.
Continued pressures by Congress" as well as the deadlocked negotiations
" See INFORMAL SINGLE NEGOTIATING TEXT, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 62/WP.8, pt. I-ill (May 7,
1975), reprinted in 14 INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS 682 (1945) [hereinafter cited as NEGOTIATING
TEXT].
7 The President insisted upon the delayed date of enforcement in anticipation of a compre-
hensive Law of the Sea Conference agreement which would render unilateral action unneces-
sary. See note 7 supra.
Fishing Zone Hearing, supra note 8, at 73, 161.
16 U.S.C.A. (Ph. 2, pt. 1, June 1976) § 1881.
3* HOUSE REP., supra note 11, at 6.
31 Id.
12 75 DEP'T STATE BULL. 395, 402 (Sept. 27, 1976).
3 Id. at 401.
THE ECONOMIST, Sept. 18, 1976, at 15.
11 HOUSE REP., supra note 11, at 6.
31 THE ECONOMIST, supra note 34.
11 The U.S. Congress is currently considering unilateral action concerning seabed mining.
For a recent version of the proposed legislation, see Hearings on Deep Seabed Hard Minerals
Act before the Subcomm. on Oceanography of the House Comm. on Merchant Marine &
Fisheries, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 357-64 (1974).
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at the fifth session of the Third LOS Conference s have led the United
States to threaten unilateral action in regard to seabed mining2' The Fish-
eries Act may lend credence to these threats and thus stimulate negotia-
tions in order to forestall another "sea-grab." However, there is a great
difference in the fundamental nature of asserting a fisheries claim to a
generally agreed upon contiguous zone and asserting unilateral claims to
the high seas. The fact that the United States has asserted a unilateral
fisheries claim without undue reaction does not mean the international
community will tolerate a claim to the high seas or even bargain to keep
the United States from asserting such a claim.
Clearly the Fisheries Act has affected both the Law of the Sea Confer-
ence negotiations and the position of the United States, but uncertainty
remains as to whether the United States will be able to utilize these
changes advantageously in further negotiations.
IV. FOREIGN RELATIONS
The Fisheries Act will obviously cause tension between the United
States and Japan and Russia, the major fishing nations which have tradi-
tionally utilized the area which will be designated as the EZ. A second
major problem will relate to whether the United States will reciprocally
recognize the 200 mile zones of certain Latin American nations or will
continue to protect the vital interests of the American tuna fishing indus-
try by nonrecognition of the zone and retention of the Fisherman's Protec-
tive Act.4 0
A. Japan
Japan has the most extensive and far-ranging fishing industry in the
world" and will be the nation most affected by the imposition of the 200
mile fishing zone either by the United States or the world community.2
Approximately 40 percent of Japan's total marine fisheries catch is from
the Northern Pacific Ocean, half of which is caught within the projected
United States fisheries zone. 4 The Japanese fishing industry is therefore
justifiably dismayed with American plans, for example, to set a quota on
the Japanese pollock catch at 60 percent of present levels."
u The Third Law of the Sea (LOS) Conference is deadlocked mainly over issues of seabed
mining. U.S. DELEGATION REP., supra note 9.
n 75 DEP'T STATE BuLL. 363, 370-71 (Sept. 20, 1976).
,0 22 U.S.C. §§ 1971-79 (Supp. V, 1975).
" Wells, Japan and the United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, 2 OcEAN Dv.
& INT'L L.J. 65, 67 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Wells].
,1 Id. at 65.
,3 Japan Fisheries Ass'n, What's 200 Miles Between Friends?, L.A. Times, Aug. 6, 1976, §
3, at 15, col. 5 (advertisement) [hereinafter cited as Jap. Fish Ass'n Ad.].
" FAR EAST ECON. REV., Oct. 15, 1976, at 67.
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Japanese and American negotiators met in Washington in August 1976,
but the two countries remained deadlocked over the 200 mile zone. Japan
maintains that the Fisheries Act is not consistent with international law, 5
does not sufficiently recognize or protect traditional Japanese fishing
rights," and is unworkable and unenforceable as to anadromous species.'
The Japanese also point out that the continuation of Japanese traditional
fishing would not harm the United States fishing industry because most
of Japan's catch is pollock. 8 Although not utilized in America, pollock is
used in Japan to make a fish sausage that the Japanese Fisheries Agency
claims supplies 10 percent of the nation's supply of animal protein." On
this basis, the Japanese have charged the United States with deprivation
of a valuable food resource in a manner totally unrelated to conservation
or management of fisheries merely to protect the United States fishing
industry. Although the fish sausage has historically been a Japanese staple
for over 1,500 years, the sausage has only been made of pollock since 1960
when other fish in the Yellow Sea dwindled because of Japanese overfish-
ing.0 It is obviously a legitimate concern of the United States to prevent
similar overfishing and resulting ecological imbalance in the North Pacific.
Japan's fishing industry is struggling to maintain its existence51 and
Japan is standing firm both in negotiations with the United States and at
the Law of the Sea Conference. The probability of Japan receiving special
concessions or considerations in either of these negotiations is extremely
limited.
The Single Negotiating Text of the LOS Conference makes several provi-
sions on behalf of geographically disadvantaged nations;" however, Japan
will not qualify as a geographically disadvantaged state under any of the
currently proposed criteria .53 There is thus little likelihood of Japan's fish-
ing industry receiving relief through a treaty resulting from the LOS Con-
ference.
Id.
" Wells, supra note 41, at 82-83.
,7 FAR EAST ECON. REV., supra note 44. Anadromous species are defined as "species of fish
which spawn in fresh or estuarive waters of the United States and which migrate to ocean
waters." Fisheries Act, 16 U.S.C.A. (Ph. 2, pt. 1, June 1976) § 1802(1).
11 FARt EAST ECON. REV., supra note 44.
40 Id.
sId.
5, The Japanese fishing industry has experienced a series of crises in the last two years
including stricter controls on whaling, the quadrupling of the price of fuel oil, recession,
increasingly high wages, greater competition from the Taiwanese and South Korean fishing
fleets, and now the imposition of 200 mile zone. Id.
" NEGOTIATING TEXT, supra note 26, at pt. II, arts. 45(2), 57, 59.
For a discussion of proposed criteria for designation of geographically disadvantaged
states and those states which would qualify under each, see Alexander & Hodgson, The Role
of the Geographically Disadvantaged States in the Law of the Sea, 13 SAN DIEo L.R. 558
(1975-76).
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In negotiations with the United States, Japan will receive relatively high
allocations based on the extent of its traditional fishing,5" but the currently
proposed quotas are not satisfactory to the Japanese Fisheries Agency.55
Japan's negotiating power is limited by the fact that there is no reciprocal
United States fishing off Japan." The Japanese have resorted to appeals
to reason and sense of fairness of the United States, as well as warnings
that the matter will become a "major cause of discord" between the two
nations and could lead to a "substantial deterioration in good will."57
Japan's foreign investments are among its strongest negotiating tools, 5 as
Japanese investment in American business and industry is extensive. 9 The
United States is extremely sensitive to the dangers of sharply curtailed
investments and the loss of a major foreign employer,6" but the Fisheries
Act makes no allowances for exemptions or executive agreements incon-
sistent with the terms of the legislation.6 '
B. Soviet Union
The Soviet Union also has a major interest in the American fisheries
zone in the North Atlantic and Pacific Oceans. The Soviet Embassy noti-
fied the State Department that the Soviet Union held "a negative view"
of the United States action.2 Although the Tass report was under a head-
ing of "Unlawful Action, 63 the embassy filed no formal protest."1 The main
concern of the Soviets was that the unilaterally declared zone would hinder
the efforts of the Law of the Sea Conference. 5
The Soviet Union supports a 200 mile economic zone but is also con-
cerned about its extensive distant water fishing fleet.6 The Soviets, there-
fore, support the idea that fishermen from other countries should be al-
" Fisheries Act, 16 U.S.C.A. (Ph. 2, pt. 1, June 1976) § 1821(e)(1).
THE ECONOMIST, supra note 34.
Fishing Zone Hearings, supra note 8, at 76-77.
Jap. Fish Ass'n Ad., supra note 43, at col. 7-8.
Wells, supra note 41, at 86.
11 Japan has a 20 percent interest in Alaska's fishery investment. THE ECONOMIST, Feb. 7,
1976, at 38.
Rather than curtail investments, the Japanese might be encouraged to make a greater
investment in the United States fishing industry in order to take advantage of the exclusive
United States EZ. Japanese fishermen had earlier used similar tactics (fishing aboard foreign
vessels) to circumvent an agreement between the United States, Canada, and Japan concern-
ing North Pacific Ocean salmon fishing. Complaints by the United States and Canada led
to strict restraints on Japanese salmon fishing abroad vessels registered in other countries.
MAR. FISH. REv., Jan. 1976, at 37.
" 16 U.S.C.A. (Ph. 2, pt. 1, June 1976) § 1821(b).
"2 Pravda, May 6, 1976, at 4, col. 8.
63 Id.
" N.Y. Times, May 6, 1976, at 13, col. 1.
" Pravda, supra note 62.
11 MAR. FISH. REv., June 1976, at 26.
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lowed to fish for species not fully utilized by a country in its economic
zone. 7 This view is one of national priorities, not a program of conservation
and management. In general, however, the United States and the Soviet
Union are aligned as to the 200 mile fisheries zone and other Law of the
Sea issues. They present a common front against the People's Republic of
China, which is currently demanding a 200 mile territorial sea with the
consequent closing of international straits to both ships and overflight. 8
The Soviet Union has agreed to discuss the transition to a 200 mile
United States fisheries zone.69 Because the Soviets accept the principle of
the 200 mile zone and have already agreed by treaty to recognize a unilater-
ally declared Canadian zone,70 the United States is in a superior bargaining
position vis-a'-vis the Soviet Union in the matter of coastal fisheries.7'
Little difficulty is anticipated in reaching an agreement.
C. Latin America
The adoption by the United States of a 200 mile fisheries zone will not
mean automatic recognition of similar zones extended unilaterally by other
states" and in particular will not recognize the restrictive zones promul-
gated by Latin American countries.7 3 The United States will not recognize
any zone that fails to take into account traditional United States fishing74
or that purports to manage highly migratory species such as tuna.75 Per-
haps the best indications of whether the Latin American countries will
agree to these reciprocal terms are illustrated by the recent Mexican clos-
ing of the Gulf of California to foreign fishing7 and the passage of a Costa
Rican law which would regulate tuna fishing within 200 miles of the Costa
Rican coast.
77
The Fishermen's Protective Act78 will not be effectively repealed by the
67 Id.
" See S. Pavlov, Detente and the World's Oceans, Pravda, Feb. 12, 1976, at 4, col. 7; see
also Pravda, May 8, 1976, at 5, col. 3.
"6 74 DEP'T STATE BULL. 498 (Apr. 12, 1976).
7' N.Y. Times, May 20, 1976, at 24, col. 6.
7' For a discussion of the effect of United States policies on relations with the Soviet Union,
see Knight, International Fisheries Management Without Global Agreement: United States
Policies and their Impact on the Soviet Union, 6 GA. J. INT'L & CoMP. L. 119 (1976).
72 Fisheries Act, 16 U.S.C.A. (Ph. 2, pt. 1, June 1976) § 1821(f).
13 KNIGHT, supra note 5, at 705-15.
" Fisheries Act, 16 U.S.C.A. (Ph. 2, pt. 1, June 1976) § 1822(e)(1).
" Id. § 1822(e)(2).
" N.Y. Times, June 7, 1976, at 8, col. 4; MAR. FIsH. REV., Jan. 1976, at 36. The major
United States fishing operation in the Gulf of California is for tuna.
" MAR. FISH. REV., Jan. 1976, at 36. This law has only been passed in first debate.
"' 22 U.S.C. §§ 1971-79 (Supp. V, 1975). The Fishermen's Protective Act was passed in 1954
to encourage fishing in areas considered high seas by the United States but regarded as
territorial waters or fishery zones by certain Latin American nations. The Act contained
provisions for compensation of owners of American vessels for losses due to seizure, penalties
and confiscation by coastal states asserting "illegal" claims.
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Fisheries Act.79 American fishermen will continue to be reimbursed for
seizure by Latin American countries on the basis of claims in territorial
seas or high seas not recognized by the United States. 0 In addition, an
amendment to the Fisherman's Protective Act will provide reimbursement
to fishermen:
[11f any general claim of any foreign country to exclusive fishery man-
agement authority is recognized by the United States, and any vessel of
the United States is seized by such foreign country on the basis of condi-
tions and restrictions under such claim, if such conditions and
restrictions-
(A) are unrelated to fishery conservation and management,
(B) fail to consider and take into account traditional fishing practices
of vessels of the United States,
(C) are greater or more onerous than the conditions and restrictions
which the United States applies to foreign fishing vessels subject to the
exclusive fishery management authority of the United States (as estab-
lished in Title I of the Fishery Conservation and Management Act of
1976), or
(D) fail to allow fishing vessels of the United States equitable access
to fish subject to such country's exclusive fishery management authority."
This provision puts the United States in the interesting position of having
the option to recognize general fisheries claims of Latin American countries
and at the same time encourage the continued violation of those claims by
United States vessels. Such a position is difficult to reconcile either by the
legislative history of the Fisherman's Protective Act" or by any precept of
customary international law. It can only be explained as a concession to
the distant water fishing industry and is sure to cause further contention
in United States-Latin American negotiations.
V. RASH OF UNILATERAL AcTiONS
Although several countries had unilaterally declared fisheries zones prior
to the United States action, these countries had neither the power nor the
influence to establish the principle of the extended economic zone as a
clearly acceptable concept in international law. The affirmation of this
principle by the United States not only aided in the acceptance of eco-
nomic zones as consistent with customary international law, but has also
See generally Meron, The Fishermen's Protective Act: A Case Study in Contemporary
Legal Strategy of the United States, 69 AM. J. INT'L L. 290 (1975) [hereinafter cited as
Meron].
Fisherman's Protective Act of 1967, 22 U.S.C. § 1973 (Supp. 1975 & Ph. 2, pt. 1, June
1976).
" Id. § 1972.
2 The legislative history indicates that this Act was based on the illegality of Latin Ameri-
can claims. Meron, supra note 79, at 305.
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afforded many countries the opportunity to extend zones unilaterally with-
out fear of adverse reaction from the United States. Other nations have
since taken action to protect their interests and improve their negotiating
positions.
A. Canada
In 1970 Canada enacted statutes establishing a 100 mile antipollution
zone8 3 and authorizing the extension of exclusive fishing zones beyond
twelve miles." Partially due to American negative reaction to the antipol-
lution zone 5 the Canadian government made no attempt to impose an
extended fisheries zone. As late as August 1975, Prime Minister Pierre
Trudeau stated that the Canadians would be foolish to jeopardize the Law
of the Sea Conference negotiations for the "purely temporary, paper suc-
cess" of a unilaterally declared economic zone. 6 However, when United
States action became imminent, Canada began to make preparations for
the extension of a 200 mile fisheries zone. Through bilateral negotiations
Canada has been assured of the recognition of its 200 mile fisheries zone
by Norway,87 the Soviet Union,8 Poland, 9 Portugal,0 and possibly Spain."
On June 4, 1976, the Canadian Foreign Secretary announced that Canada
will unilaterally extend its fishery jurisdiction to 200 miles effective Janu-
ary 1, 1977.'1
The United States and Canada are currently negotiating two instru-
ments in preparation for the extensions of jurisdiction: a new Pacific
Salmon Treaty and a comprehensive bilateral fisheries treaty. The objec-
tive of the Salmon Treaty is limitation of the interception by either country
of salmon originating in the other's rivers. 4 Through a comprehensive
agreement Canada hopes to continue reciprocal fishing privileges, regulate
fish stocks in boundary regions and establish a bilateral fisheries commis-
sion." As an interim measure the United States and Canada have extended
' Henkin, supra note 6, at 131.
' Id. An Act to amend the Territorial Sea and Fishing Zone Act, CAN. REV. STAT. c. 68
(1969-70), reprinted in 9 INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS 543 (1970).
11 Henkin, supra note 6, at 131-32. See also U.S. Dep't of State Press Release No. 121 (April
15, 1970), reprinted in 9 INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS 605 (1970).
11 Canadian Officials Reject Unilateral Extension of 200 Mile Economic Zone, MAR. FISH.
REV., Dec. 1975, at 37.
,1 Current Legal Developments: Law of the Sea, 25 INT'L & COMe. L.Q. 685, 686 (1976)
rhereinafter cited as Current Legal Developments].
N.Y. Times, May 20, 1976, at 24, col. 6.
" MAR. FIsH. REV., March 1976, at 31.
' Wall St. J., June 7, 1976, at 12, col. 3.
MAR. FIsH. REV., June 1976, at 27.
02 N.Y. Times, June 5, 1976, at 5, col. 5.
'a Address by J.H. Warren, Canadian Ambassador to the United States, to the Rotary Club
of Boston (Sept. 15, 1976).
' Id.
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their Agreement on Reciprocal Fishing Privileges 6 until April 24, 1977." 7
B. Mexico
Mexico claimed a 200 mile exclusive economic zone by decree of January
22, 1976, amending article 27 of its Constitution. 8 Mexico claimed sover-
eign rights for the purposes of exploration, exploitation, conservation, and
management of all natural resources within the zone including marine life
and minerals." It recognized that other states retain freedom of navigation,
overflight, and laying of submarine cables and pipelines. 00
Foreign vessels will be required to purchase permits "for each trip" and
will be allowed to fish for stocks that exceed the capacity of the Mexican
fishing industry.' Permits will not be granted, however, for certain species
which have been restricted by law for exclusive exploitation by the Mexi-
can fishing industry.' Foreign fishing rights will be gradually reduced
with a long range goal of total exclusion.0 3 The Gulf of California has been
declared "interior waters" and closed to foreign fishing.1'0 These restric-
tions will have an immediate detrimental effect on United States tuna
fishing interests in the Gulf of California and its shrimp fishing industry
in the Gulf of Mexico. 0 5
The Mexican legislation includes additional provisions that will aid in
the development of its fishing industry. Foreign fishing companies are
Id.
April 24, 1970, United States-Canada, 21 U.S.T. 1283, T.I.A.S. No. 6879.
" 74 DEP'T STATE BULL. 731 (June 7, 1976).
D.O. (Mex.), Feb. 13, 1976, reprinted in 15 INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS 382 (1976).
" Id. at 383. Article 4:
Within the exclusive economic zone, the Nation has:
I. Sovereign rights of exploration and exploitation, conservation and management
of natural resources, both renewable and nonrenewable of the seabed, including the
subsoil, and the superjacent waters;
II. Exclusive rights and jurisdiction with regard to the establishment and use of
artificial islands, installations, and structures;
m. Exclusive jurisdiction with regard to other activities relating to the explora-
tion and economic exploitation of the zone;
IV. Jurisdiction over:
(a) Preservation of the marine environment, including pollution control
and abatement;
(b) Scientific research.
' Id. Article 5 states: "Within the exclusive economic zone foreign States shall enjoy
freedom of navigation and overflight, the right to lay underwater cables and pipelines, and
the right to other internationally lawful uses related to navigation and communications."
o Decree Amending Law on Fisheries Development, D.O. (Mex.), Feb. 13, 1976, reprinted
in 15 INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS 385 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Mexican Decree].
02 Id. at 386.
"o N.Y. Times, June 7, 1976, at 8, col. 4.
104 Id.
1*1 Fishing companies averaged $15 million a year on shrimp caught within Mexico's exclu-
sive economic zone. J. of Com. and Commercial, March 3, 1976, at 1, col. 4.
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required to share their technology and industrial processing methods with
Mexico gratuitously.0 8 In addition, 50 percent of all crews of foreign ves-
sels must be Mexican citizens receiving pay and benefits identical to those
of foreign crewmen. 07 This zone was effective on June 6, 1976.108
C. Iceland
On October 15, 1975, Iceland extended its fisheries zone from 50 to 200
miles'08 and instigated a third "Cod War" with Great Britain."0 Because
cod represents 40 percent of the country's total exports, Iceland considered
the extension of the fisheries zone a matter of economic survival.", The
zone may indeed protect endangered Icelandic fishing stocks; however,
retaliatory trade tariffs imposed by the European Common Market, a
growing trade deficit and negative net foreign exchange reserves may also
be directly related to the extension of the 200 mile zone."2
Great Britain's codfishing industry in Icelandic waters amounted to $69
million a year."3 Unwilling to concede this substantial portion of its fishing
industry to such Icelandic action, Great Britain ordered Royal Navy ships
to accompany British trawlers and protect them from Icelandic gun-
boats."' A series of incidents ensued, climaxed by Icelandic severance of
relations with Britain in February 1976."1
Pressure from NATO allies who feared loss of the key NATO base at
Keflavik, the expense of navy-protected fishing and the inevitable world-
wide recognition of 200 mile economic zones"' caused tacit recognition by
Britain of the Icelandic zone through a six month agreement that limited
the numbers of British trawlers entering the zone." 7 The agreement also
arranged negotiations for a long-term reciprocal fishing agreement between
Iceland and the European Economic Community (EEC)."'
Iceland had concluded earlier agreements with Belgium, the Federal
Republic of Germany, and Norway"9 to limit the fishing of these countries
I" Mexican Decree, supra note 101, at 386.
107 Id.
,0' Current Legal Developments, supra note 87, at 685.
" Id. at 687.
See generally Bilder, The Anglo-Icelandic Fisheries Dispute, 1973 Wisc. L.R. 37;
Churchill, The Fisheries Jurisdiction Cases: The Contribution of the International Court of
Justice 40, 24 INT'L & CoMP. L.Q. 82 (1975).
TIME, June 14, 1976, at 37.
,, CoM. TODAY, Nov. 10, 1975, at 30.
,l TIME, supra note 111.
" Id.
THE ECONOMIST, Feb. 21, 1976, at 13.
,, THE ECONOMIST, May 29, 1976, at 51.
,, Agreement Concerning British Fishing in Icelandic Waters, June 1, 1976, reprinted in
15 INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS 878 (1976).
Ho Id. at 888-89.
Current Legal Developments, supra note 87, at 687.
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within the zone. By reaching an accord with Britain, Iceland has clearly
established its sovereignty in the zone and will enjoy a distinct advantage
over Great Britain in subsequent EEC-Icelandic negotiation.
D. European Economic Community
On September 23, 1976, the EEC Commission called for the imposition
of a joint 200 mile economic zone for the nine community countries.2 0 The
zone will apply to fishing rights only'2' and each state will maintain its own
claims as to seabed oil and minerals on the basis of the Geneva Convention
on the Continental Shelf.'22 The restriction of the joint zone to fishing
rights alone was a major concession to Britain and Ireland,'23 but these
countries did not receive the special 50 mile exclusive fishing zone that
they demanded within the joint EZ. All member nations will have exclu-
sive rights only within the twelve mile territorial sea.' 2
Although Britain has violently opposed the establishment of worldwide
200 mile economic zones as "flagrantly inequitable," she has recently de-
cided that the imposition of such zones is inevitable and that her best
course, therefore, is not to resist but to attempt to improve her position. 5
Britain hopes to accomplish this as to fishing and seabed oil by the annexa-
tion of Rockall, an islet 250 miles west of Scotland.'26 This is the only
direction in which Great Britain can extend a full 200 mile boundary. If
Rockall can generate an economic zone, Britain will control an additional
125,000 square mile area.2 7 However, it is unlikely that any LOS Confer-
ence agreement will allow an uninhabitable rock to create such an exten-
sive zone.'25
The French cabinet has acted independently of the EEC in regard to its
territories. On June 16, 1976, France adopted a draft bill claiming exclu-
sive exploration and exploitation rights on and under the seabed and in
all waters up to 200 miles from any territory administered by France.2 9 If
islands are allowed to generate 200 mile zones, this action will greatly
increase the areas under French control.
E. Other Unilateral Actions
Prior to January 1, 1974, eleven nations, predominantly Latin American,
'1 THE ECONOMIST, Oct. 2, 1976, at 14.
Mll THE ECONOMIST, Sept. 18, 1976, at 16.
,2 April 29, 1958, [19641 15 U.S.T. 471, T.I.A.S. No. 5578, 499 U.N.T.S. 311 (effective for
United States June 10, 1964).
In THE ECONOMIST, supra note 121.
2, THE ECONOMIST, supra note 120.
'1 THE ECONOMIST, Mar. 13, 1976, at 13.
12, THE ECONOMIST, supra note 121.
127 id.
12K Id.
,2, N.Y. Times, June 17, 1976, at 18, col. 8.
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had claimed 200 mile economic zones or their equivalent.'13 In the following
months at least nineteen other States, either in anticipation of or as a
direct result of United States enactment of the Fisheries Act, have an-
nounced the unilateral extension of 200 mile economic zones or their equiv-
alent.'" In addition to those already mentioned, Colombia,' 3' Senegal,
3 2
Somalia,' 3  Norway,' India,'3 and Sri Lanka '- have recently declared 200
mile zones. Korea has also announced its intention to extend a 200 mile
fishing zone3 7 and Greenland has proposed a 100 mile zone.'3 8 Action by
other coastal nations is likely to follow.
VI. CONCLUSION
The most important consequence of the passage of the Fisheries Act lies
in the legitimization of the unilateral establishment of 200 mile economic
zones. Although the concept of the economic zone had been generally
accepted by the LOS Conference, few nations had been willing to unilater-
ally extend such zones in the face of strong opposition from both the United
States and the Soviet Union. The adoption of a 200 mile EZ by the United
States made unilateral extension an acceptable concept. The result, how-
ever, has been a virtual "sea-grab" by coastal nations either because they
no longer feared denunciation by the United States or anticipated loss of
prestige or bargaining power by awaiting resolution of the issue by the Law
of the Sea Conference.
Even though the successful unilateral extension of these zones may
lessen the incentive of coastal nations to reach agreement at the LOS
Conference, it is the geographically disadvantaged and developing states
that are actually causing the deadlock in major areas of the Conference.
The United States will be in a better bargaining position vis-A-vis these
states concerning seabed mining and other issues as it becomes apparent
that most nations are willing to act unilaterally. The power of the geo-
graphically disadvantaged and developing states in the LOS Conference
is derived from the fact that they control a majority vote in the United
Nations General Assembly, but this control is no defense to unilateral
action. The only method by which these nations will be able to protect
their interests is by compromising their demands in the LOS Conference.
The United States hoped to control the nature and extent of unilaterally
130 KNIGHT, supra note 5, at 702.
"13 Current Legal Developments, supra note 87, at 688.
13 WORLD NEWS DIGEST, Aug. 14, 1976, at 591.
"3 22 KEESING'S CONTEMPORARY ARCHIVES 27514 (Jan. 9, 1976).
"3 THE ECONOMIST, supra note 120.
"3 FAR EAST. ECON. REV., supra note 44.
I" Id.
17 MAR. FISH. REV., June 1976, at 38.
'3 MAR. FISH. REV., April 1976, at 33.
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imposed zones by other nations through provisions in the Fisheries Act
requiring reciprocity as a requirement for United States recognition of a
zone,131 and by giving the Secretary of State the right to prohibit importa-
tion of fish products"0 from nations that refuse United States vessels equi-
table access to their zones or which impose more restrictive terms than
those established in the Fisheries Act."' It is unrealistic to believe that
such unilaterally imposed limitations can be workable or enforceable.
These provisions of the Fisheries Act seem to have had little or no effect
on zones declared to this point. These types of problems can only be re-
solved through bilateral negotiations. The United States appears to have
established new customary international law as to the right of a nation to
declare unilaterally a 200 mile economic zone-but the United States has
not been successful in attempts to unilaterally manipulate that right.
Donna Repetske Christie
' Fisheries Act, 16 U.S.C.A. (Ph. 2, pt. 1, June 1976) § 1822(e).
", Id. § 1825(b).
' Id. § 1825(a).
